The Punishment Phase: IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding*

Inken von Borzyskowski† Felicity Vabulas‡

10 December 2015

** Work in progress – please do not quote. Comments welcome **

Abstract

A large body of research has explored how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can help states democratize by providing incentives, serving as commitment devices, and generating potential sanctions for political backsliding. While many IGOs indeed espouse domestic political standards and vouch to punish members for political regressions, we know surprisingly little about when IGOs actually suspend member states for backsliding on their commitments to democracy, human rights, and political stability. Using original data, we explain why membership suspension for political backsliding is rare and why this targeted sanction is applied unevenly. We argue that suspension involves significant collective action challenges among remaining states, and that member states are more likely to suspend political backsliders when they are "willing and able" to mobilize. Members are more politically *willing* to suspend violators when their IGO's charter indicates strong democratic commitment, when the IGO is comprised of a higher concentration of democratic states, and when the violator is not allied with the regional power. In addition to willingness, member states are better *able* to suspend when IGO voting thresholds are lower and when the IGO is moderately sized because institutional barriers to mobilization are lower. Using our original data on IGO suspensions worldwide since 1980, statistical analyses provide compelling support for the "willing and able" argument. This tests a central assumption in the literature on IGOs as commitment devices, and broadens our understanding of their role in democratization, enforcement, and targeted sanctioning.

*We wish to thank participants of the Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO) 2014 meeting and the Annual Political Science Association (APSA) 2013 and 2014 meetings for helpful comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Nisha Choksi and Medha Surampudy for research assistance. All errors remain our own.

†Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Florida State University; Email: i.Borzyskowski@fsu.edu.

‡Postdoctoral Lecturer, University of Chicago; E-mail: fvabulas@uchicago.edu.

Scholars and policy-makers alike have long been interested in the role that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play in countries' domestic politics, including democratization, human rights, and political stability. Research has shown that IGOs can help states democratize through diplomatic pressure and socialization,[1] economic sanctions,[2] and by acting as commitment devices.[3] Much of this work on the IGO-democratization link rests on the notion that IGOs enable governments to credibly commit to reforms, and that leaders will adhere to democratic standards because they fear suspension from the IGO.[4] To underscore this central assumption with an example, Reiter (2001: 52) notes that "[NATO] membership can be used as a stick to spur democratization: Any new member that reverts to authoritarian rule would be ejected from the alliance."[5] In other words, scholars emphasize that IGOs best serve as commitment devices to democracy if they provide punishments for rule violators, otherwise abuses of their commitments are not costly and commitments would not be credible. IGOs that have the power to suspend a state in response to violations of democracy may be effective vehicles for upholding democratic commitments because violations come at a high cost.[6]

The literature, however, is largely silent on whether and when the stick of suspension due to political backsliding is actually applied. In addition to the rich theoretical literature on the importance of IGO suspension as a tool to enforce democratic commitments, the importance of this topic is bolstered by the fact that policymakers[7] and journalists fre-

[1]Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Poast and Urpelainen 2013.

[2]Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Hazelzet 2005.

[3]Simmons and Danner 2010; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008. Also see Moravcsik 2000 for human rights specifically.

[4]For example, Snidal (1985) argues the "threat of exclusion, if credible, may be an important device for ensuring that states behave cooperatively." Also see Pevehouse 2002a; Donno 2013.

[5]Reiter (2001, 52) continues: "Without the threat of rejection from NATO, a tyrannical cabal within a state could permit democratic reforms, earn alliance membership, and then re-impose authoritarian rule (perhaps through a military coup) without jeopardizing the state's membership status."

[6]Drezner 2003, 223.

[7]For example, UK foreign secretary David Miliband pushed the Commonwealth to suspend Pakistan in 2007 to pressure it to hold free and fair elections (Wintour 2007). Further, in May 2013, German politician Doris Pack proposed the Council of Europe suspend Bosnia for failing to uphold human rights rulings. Available at `http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/european-mps-to-decide-suspending-bosnia-from-council-of-europe.` Accessed 12 June 2015.

quently show optimism in the ability of IGO suspensions to push politically backsliding states back on track.[8] Consistent with this belief in their effectiveness, policymakers have increasingly used IGO suspension to sanction members that have violated democratic commitments. For example, in the year 2012 alone, the Organization of Islamic Conference suspended Syria due to President Bashar al-Assad's violent suppression of the Syrian revolt; Mercosur suspended Paraguay over the ouster of President Fernando Lugo; the African Union, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali due to the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Tour and the military takeover of the government; the African Union and Organisation internationale de la Francophonie suspended Guinea-Bissau after a coup d'état by the West African state's military chiefs; and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie suspended the Central African Republic, denouncing a coup d'état. Yet many other episodes of political backsliding were not punished with suspensions.

When do IGOs suspend states for political backsliding? And why do they sometimes let violators escape this sanction? We examine suspensions within and across IGOs to determine when political backsliding is punished. In line with IGO charter commitments, we define political backsliding to include human rights violations, coups d'état, severe election irregularities, and government-induced states of emergency.[9] This definition accounts for the fact that IGO suspensions are often not just aimed at punishing democratic reversals but also aimed at discouraging domestic political regressions, including dislodging elected leaders or violating human rights commitments.

We draw on collective action theory to explain variation in IGO suspensions for political backsliding. Collective action theory highlights the difficulty that groups encounter in trying

[8]For example, the Economist argued that Venezuela's neighbors should suspend it from the South American Union because "the threat of becoming a pariah might give Mr. Maduro pause." Available at `http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645193-authoritarian-regime-becoming-naked-dictatorship-region-must-react-slow-motion?frsc=dg|c.Accessed14April2015.`

[9]We group these four categories together into our broader analysis of "political backsliding" rather than just democratic backsliding because they are all forms of domestic political behavior that (1) groups of states frequently commit to uphold when acceding to IGOs and that (2) are often closely linked and therefore difficult to untangle into unique types of violations.

to act when the incentives to free-ride are strong. In this case, member states encounter free-riding motives when they look to punish a politically backsliding state because it can be both politically and economically costly to sever ties with the violator. Building on collective action theory, we therefore argue that suspension will be more likely to occur when remaining IGO member states are both "willing and able" to suspend a backsliding state. In terms of political *willingness,* IGOs with stronger democratic commitments in their Charters and those made up of more democratic states have greater incentives to suspend politically backsliding states because democratic norms are more salient. The remaining IGO member states are more willing to overcome collective action challenges and suspend political backsliders because they (1) have formally agreed to a stronger commitment to domestic political standards and (2) can credibly pressure the violator to change (since they themselves maintain higher democratic credentials). This argument is consistent with Pevehouse (2002a), who emphasizes the importance of the remaining states' willingness when considering suspension: "Political will becomes important especially when it involves direct cost to states. Enforcement costs also include opportunity costs: if an IO confronts a condition violator, they can suspend that state's membership." Furthermore, IGO member states are more willing to suspend states that do not have an alliance relationship with the regional power, which underscores the importance of geostrategic ties in (de-) mobilizing states to act as a group.

In addition to political *willingness,* we also draw on collective action theory to highlight the institutional *ability* of remaining IGO members to suspend a politically backsliding state. The institutional structure (the IGO's voting rules) and the group size (the number of IGO members) affect remaining member states' ability to overcome collective action challenges and suspend a state. Gaining sufficient support and passing a vote for suspension is easier in IGOs with lower suspension voting thresholds (e.g. simple majority rules) than IGOs with stricter rules (e.g. consensus minus one). Furthermore, moderately-sized IGOs have a greater ability to overcome the collective action challenges inherent in larger groups (Olson

1965) because it is easier for them to come together and act. Moderately-sized IGOs are also more likely than small IGOs to suspend a politically backsliding state because the IGO does not risk collapse.

We undertake a statistical analysis of an original global dataset of IGO suspensions following political backsliding from 1980 to 2010. This analysis focuses on "democratically committed" IGOs (i.e. those organizations that reference democracy, human rights, or the rule of law in their constitutive documents) because these are the only IGOs that we should reasonably expect to suspend politically backsliding states. For example, IGOs like the European Union (EU), Council of Europe (CoE), Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), and Organization of American States (OAS) all condition membership upon democracy whereas IGOs like the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization do not mention commitments to democracy, human rights, or political standards.[10] Our statistical analyses support the argument that the *political willingness and institutional ability* of remaining member states greatly influence when they can overcome collective action challenges and suspend politically backsliding states.

Our study has important implications for several research strands in international relations, including work on international democracy promotion, targeted sanctions, IGO design, and IGO practices. First, we extend the work on democratic enforcement through IGOs. Existing studies have largely focused on international triggers that help countries "move forward."[11] In contrast, we examine what happens when states move backwards and violate their commitments. That is, we instead examine techniques that are used to punish a state that has temporarily gotten off its democracy-course. Our original dataset is useful in this vein because it is the first to document which IGOs have a democracy, human rights, or rule of law clause in their charter, paving the way for future research on related issues.

[10]Pevehouse 2002a. In fact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations states as a goal to "oppose intervention on the pretext of human rights."

[11]Donno 2013, 2010; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Levitsky and Way 2005. We build on Donno's work but include more IGOs (54 versus 13), a wider geographic scope (worldwide versus two regions), longer time (30 versus 18 years), and more backsliding types.

Second, we focus on IGO suspensions as a type of targeted diplomatic sanction. Previous scholars have not considered this tool in the sanctioning menu. We show that international tools to punish political backsliding extend beyond economic sanctions, cuts in foreign aid, and reductions in foreign direct investment[12] to include IGO suspension. In doing so, we add to the growing emphasis on targeted sanctions[13] and broaden the range of sanctions tools under consideration.

Third, we contribute to research on how institutional design[14] and IGO heterogeneity[15] affect organizational outcomes. We show that suspension is influenced not only by the IGO's commitment to democratic principles (which extend beyond traditional design features often recognized in the literature) but also by the member states' political willingness to remove a violator. Fourth, we contribute to scholarship that focuses on how IGOs work in practice[16] rather than just looking at IGO membership rates, rules, and potential benefits.[17] In other words, our study brings together the political and institutional constraints that shape behavior. Our analyses reveal that organizations practice suspensions in a more nuanced fashion than international relations theory suggests. We hope to promote further research by contributing original data on the actual occurrence of IGO suspensions after political backsliding – not just their theoretical possibility – since World War II.

[12]Martin 1993; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Nossal 1989; Jensen 2003; Busse and Hefeker 2007.
[13]Drezner 2011; Cameron 2003; Hufbauer and Oegg 2000; Biersteker, Eckert and Turinho 2015.
[14]Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
[15]Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Karreth and Tir 2013.
[16]Pouliot 2008; Adler and Pouliot 2011.
[17]Abbott and Snidal 1998.

1 IGO Membership Suspensions after Political Backsliding

Suspension from an intergovernmental organization[18] occurs when member states remove some or all of a violator state's membership benefits.[19] Specifically, a suspended state is not allowed to vote, attend meetings, or otherwise participate in IGO decisions. We consider IGO membership suspension to be a type of multilateral, targeted diplomatic sanction.[20] Heretofore, however, the diplomatic sanction literature has focused on bilateral sanctions such as recalling ambassadors, closing embassies, and withholding recognition of a regime.[21] A similar dynamic plays out at the multilateral level where IGO members can cut ties with violator states to express disapproval, stigmatize, or isolate the regime. IGO suspension can signal targets, domestic constituencies, and the international community of rule violations.[22]

We focus on IGO suspensions in response to political backsliding rather than other state behaviors (like financial, economic, or military violations) for two reasons. The first is theoretical: there is a focused body of work that builds on the notion that an IGO suspension following political backsliding can act as a credible threat to maintain compliance.[23] Furthermore, existing studies evaluate international tools to punish domestic political misbehavior but they pay scant attention to IGO suspension as one of the tools in the menu.[24] Bringing these two distinct bodies of work together prompts an analysis of when IGO suspension is employed to sanction politically backsliding states. The second reason for our focus on suspensions following political backsliding is empirical: the full dataset of IGO suspensions

[18]We define IGOs as formal entities between three or more member states with significant institutionalization, such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff (Pevehouse et al 2004).

[19]The definition of suspension is directly related to IGO membership and therefore suspension of aid/ development cooperation are not included. See Hazelzet 2005 for more on this.

[20]One exception is Magliveras (1999) who focuses on IGO suspensions from a legal perspective. See Maller 2010 for a review of how diplomatic sanctions can be costly coercion tools.

[21]Maller 2011; Morgan et al. 2009.

[22]Doxey 1971.

[23]Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Poast and Urpelainen 2013.

[24]Nossal 1989; Donno 2010; Hufbauer and Oegg 2000. We control for other sanction tools in the form of economic sanctions in the statistical analysis (see robustness, Appendix Table 1).

shows that most suspensions are due to political backsliding. Of the 95 IGO suspensions since World War II, 48 were in response to a member state violating political norms.[25] Furthermore, the fact that almost half of IGO suspensions happen in response to domestic misbehavior is surprising because one might expect suspensions of this sort to be difficult due to sovereignty issues. To reiterate, it is noteworthy that in IGO fora set up to facilitate international cooperation, the behavior that most often triggers suspension includes *domestic* political actions.

We argue there are several reasons why IGO suspensions are particularly ubiquitous following domestic misbehavior. First, coups d'état, disputed elections, and government-induced states of emergency offer an explicit focal point for action. They happen at specific points in time and therefore prompt a more focused raison d'être for member states to come together and act. Other violations of IGO agreements may instead be more diffuse, making it more difficult to pin-point the time when states should mobilize. This is directly related to the collective action challenges that are central to our theory. Second, economic or security violations may be better served by other mechanisms such as interstate mediation, negotiation, or arbitration. These dispute settlement mechanisms aim to keep states in the organization. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) handles violations of trade agreements not by ejecting the state from the WTO, but instead by utilizing an extensive dispute settlement mechanism within the institution in order to maintain the regime.[26] Third, by focusing on violations in one particular issue area, we can better focus on common themes in member states' commitments and shortfalls to domestic political norms. This provides theoretical clarity and clear empirical scope.

An example of a suspension for political backsliding and its importance is illustrative. In early July 2013, the 54 member-state African Union (AU) suspended Egypt following

[25]Out of these 48 suspensions, 43 were violations of democracy and human rights standards. Another 5 cases were government-sponsored violence; these 5 suspensions regard Syria and Libya after 2011 and are thus not included in our analysis, which is constricted to 2010 due to the availability of other data.

[26]See, e.g., Rosendorff 2005.

President Morsi's ouster in a military coup.[27] The AU argued that "the overthrow of the democratically elected president [was] an unconstitutional change of government," and that suspension was mandated by AU instruments "until the restoration of constitutional order."[28] Yet suspension from the AU constituted a collective action problem involving both vociferous advocates and reluctant members, leading to extended discussions and debate.[29] While the AU espouses a commitment to democratic principles, enforcement of these standards varies. IGO punishment hinges on whether "political will is mobilized to address the internal issues of social and political exclusion, [and] authoritarianism."[30] Ultimately, AU member states overcame collective action challenges and voted to suspend Egypt. While the suspension vote passed, it was not unanimous, highlighting the importance of voting rules.[31] The AU reinstated Egypt in June 2014 after it approved a new constitution, elected a new President, and scheduled to elect a new parliament.[32]

Egypt's suspension reflects a broader trend in the AU and among other IGOs which have increasingly suspended governments that regress from political commitments like democracy and human rights standards. In fact, IGO suspensions due to political backsliding have increased five-fold since 1990, as shown in Figure 1.[33] This dramatic rise in suspensions[34] is due to the increasing number of states in the post-Cold War era that have made international commitments to domestic political standards, including passing explicit amendments to IGO

[27] African Union 2013c.
[28] African Union 2013c.
[29] Patel 2013.
[30] Murithi 2007.
[31] The AU has a simple majority rule for suspension. A stricter rule, such as super-majority or consensus minus one, might have thwarted this suspension motion.
[32] African Union 2014.
[33] Note that while there are 48 cases in the wider universe of suspensions in our dataset, Figure 1 only displays 29 cases to align with our statistical models' focus on 1980-2010. In other words, some older cases and very recent cases are not included in Figure 1 due to the unavailability of control variables for our models.
[34] In line with the challenges and costs of collective action, suspension remains rare relative to the abundance of political backsliding (Only 1 of about 50 instances of backsliding each year from 1980 to 2010 has resulted in suspension.) However, note that suspensions do not have to occur frequently in order to influence behavior and increase compliance (Donno 2010). This is similar to sanctions by the World Trade Organization which are infrequent (despite myriad disputes in which a defendant government was judged in violation) but can be powerful. Charnovitz 2001.

charters concerning democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Yet few states have consistently complied with these standards.[35] With the end of a bipolar international system and the rise of democracy promotion worldwide, new emphasis has been placed on IGOs enforcing these standards. As a result, IGO suspensions due to political backsliding have occurred across a wide range of IGOs, as shown in Figure 2. The African Union, Commonwealth, and ECOWAS are the most frequent suspenders.

FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE

IGO suspensions after political backsliding matter for international relations because they can be politically and materially costly for remaining members. For example, when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) suspended Yugoslavia for gross and uncorrected violations in commitments in 1992 – invoking the "consensus minus one" protocol for the first and only time in the organization's history[36] – remaining members suffered. By suspending Yugoslavia, the OSCE denied itself the possibility of taking other actions including a role in conflict prevention and interventions by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).[37] Moreover, in light of the suspension, the Yugoslav authorities refused to renew the visas of OSCE missions to Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandjak, thus also diminishing the role of the OSCE in the region.[38]

Equally important, however, IGO suspensions can be costly and lengthy for the violating state itself. Suspensions usually last two to three years.[39] With regard to the previous example, Egypt could not be elected into a policy-making position in the AU or participate in the U.S.Africa summit until constitutional order was restored. As a result, "its influence on African affairs [was] greatly reduced, a critical need in part because of access to the source of the River Nile."[40] The AU's suspension of Egypt also challenged and weakened the authority

[35]Magliveras and Naldi 2002, 424.
[36]Available at `http://www.osce.org/node/58332` Accessed 18 November 2015.
[37]Spector and Zartman 2003, 173.
[38]Ibid.
[39]Authors' calculation based on original data. The average IGO suspension length after political backsliding is 31 months. See online appendix.
[40]Smith 2014.

of the military-backed government in Cairo. The U.S. and other donors took the suspension as a cue to cut foreign aid.[41] In subsequent weeks, Cairo launched a diplomatic offensive, sending envoys to numerous African capitals to lobby for the reversal of the decision.[42] Emphasizing the costs that accrue on violator states underscores the importance of IGO suspensions in international relations. Our systematic knowledge of this enforcement tool, however, is limited.

To be sure, Figure 2 highlights that many of the IGO suspensions following political backsliding occur in smaller IGOs. Some may therefore argue that these are not "as important" or costly as if they had occurred from the better known international institutions such as the United Nations, European Union, or World Bank. But this is far from the truth. For example, veterans of the Commonwealth of Nations summitry say "the mix of informality and royal glamour is a heady experience for the leaders of small countries who rarely tread the world stage."[43] Being denied membership even from institutions that appear to operate merely as "talk shops" is therefore a costly encounter.

The lack of IGO suspensions from the European Union is surprising at first. Judged by its charter commitments (and accession conditionality), the EU is arguably the most democratically committed organization. Further, it is moderately sized, falling in the 'sweet spot' number of member states that would enable collective action without creating the demise of the institution. Third, it has a suspension clause (Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union), which explicitly allows suspending membership rights if a country seriously and persistently breaches the founding principles (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law).[44] However, voting rules are more strict than simple majority rule and provide a high bar for overcoming collective action challenges among remaining member states to use this sanctioning mechanism. Any suspension vote

[41]Ibid. Also see Murdie and Davis 2012 on IGOs shaming HR violations.

[42]Available at `http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/egypt-vs-african-union-mutually-u-2014714687899839.html` Accessed 12 June 2015.

[43]Available at `http://www.economist.com/node/10180893` Accessed 18 November 2015.

[44]Available at: `http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/suspension_clause.html` Accessed 15 December, 2015.

needs four fifths of remaining members in Parliament, and the initial hurdle to schedule a suspension vote is one third of EU countries. What arguably makes EU member states least likely to overcome these strict voting rules to suspend backsliding members (e.g. Hungary, and Romania during 2012-13) is a weak consensus on how to enforce democratic commitments due to the deeply intertwined nexus of institutional relationships.[45]

2 Theoretical Argument

To explain variation in IGO suspensions of politically backsliding states, we argue that collective action costs are central.[46] Importantly, IGO member states – not IGO bureaucrats – are key actors in suspensions: member states control the process of suspension by putting suspension motions on the agenda,[47] voting, and announcing suspension decisions.[48] IGO suspension therefore entails member states coming together in a group voting procedure which creates a high bar for collective action. One state cannot unilaterally suspend a state to protect the public good of democracy. Olson's (1965) model of collective action[49] illustrates why unless a group (here the set of IGO members) has very specific characteristics, the group will fail to organize (i.e. to suspend a politically backsliding state), even if there are definite benefits from doing so. In other words, all things equal, we expect that collective action for suspension will be more than likely to fail even though a group of IGO member states (or the institution itself) may benefit from the suspension of a violator. Suspension can be beneficial because it can (1) help the IGO maintain its reputation for upholding political ideals, (2) help enforce other IGO commitments by showing the IGO will act, and (3) push the violator state to change its behavior by signaling the denouncement to the international community. In other words, suspension can benefit all members by demonstrating that the

[45]Sedelmeier 2014.

[46]Marshall (1998) defines collective action as 'the action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members' perceived shared interests.'

[47]The Liberal Group in the EP put Hungary's July 2013 threat on the agenda (HR Watch 2013).

[48]For example, in 2009, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) suspended Fiji for political backsliding. Samoa's Prime Minister released a statement on the suspension to Radio Australia (Pareti 2013).

[49]Hardin (1971 and 1982) shows collective action problems as N-person prisoner's dilemmas.

IGO will *truly* "tie the hands" of members.

But individual IGO member states face incentives to not suspend because there are also heavy transaction costs[50] for coordination and mobilization among remaining states.[51] This deserves further emphasis. Most research shows that IGOs help states *overcome* collective action problems,[52] but once states have "solved" these dilemmas and formed an IGO, internal collective action challenges can still determine how IGOs *function in practice*.[53]

Since suspending a violator takes extensive effort, it is likely that some but not all states will push for punishment. Olson (1965) highlights that individual (states) contribute less to collective goods if their marginal costs rise.[54] Some member states may be dismayed by political backsliding but value diplomatic relations with the violator, rely on its financial contributions to the IGO, or care about their own pet issues more than suspension for domestic political transgressions. Moreover, even after states have mobilized, set the agenda, and attended discussion meetings, a formal vote usually ensues which might fail to reach a necessary minimum threshold.[55] This results in the classic dilemma of "sub-optimal" (less than expected) enforcement of the public good, democracy. That is, the *practice* of suspension is not automatic. In sum, when states fail to honor domestic political commitments, remaining IGO members need to be "willing and able" for collective action on suspension to succeed. Kelley (2013, 93) summarizes this as follows: "Suspensions and expulsions are drastic measures, and they are difficult to execute because they require a high level of agreement among member states."

[50] Williamson 1981.

[51] For example, on 25 March 2013, AU member states formally voted to suspend the Central African Republic after Seleka rebels ousted President Francois Bozize (African Union 2013a). This occurred only after the AU Peace and Security Council had convened multiple times and members had already issued travel bans and asset freezing (African Union 2013b). Note that we control for bilateral economic sanctions in the robustness section; the results are unaffected.

[52] Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984.

[53] Olson 1965; Hardin 1982.

[54] This is borne out by game theoretic studies including Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984).

[55] For more on voting, see Blake and Lockwood-Payton 2014.

2.1 IGOs that are "Willing:" The Importance of Political Preferences

We focus our attention on "democratically committed" IGOs: those with charter commitments to democracy, human rights, or rule of law because these are the IGOs that we should expect to have the possibility of suspending member states for failing to uphold democratic commitments. An ever-increasing number of IGOs have incorporated 'democracy clauses' in their constitutive instruments.[56] By our definition there were 54 democratically committed IGOs in the year 2010.[57]

However, democratically committed IGOs still vary in the *strength* of their commitment. This is important because research on collective action shows that individual (states) prefer interacting with similar states. More homogeneous political preferences make collective action easier. Since the issue at stake is upholding domestic political norms, collective action toward suspension should be more likely in IGOs whose members are strongly committed to the ideal of democracy (as articulated in the IGO charter). While we only study IGOs with a commitment to democracy, human rights, and/or rule of law in their charter, some of these charters only vaguely reference these principles in introductory clauses or with weak statements. Other IGOs show a stronger commitment to democracy by specifying that these norms will also be actively promoted within the IGO. Collective action should be easier in the latter group because states have more clarity and unified commitment a priori. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) is in our sample from the outset. In 1948, the OAS's founding charter articulated a commitment to democracy, albeit weak, stating "Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights

[56] Magliveras and Naldi 2002.

[57] For further coding information on "democratically committed IGOs," see Table 1, the research design section, and the online appendix.

of man... ."[58] In 1998, however, we note a jump in the strength of the OAS's democratic commitment when it passed the Washington Protocol which added the new Article 9 to Chapter III of the Charter. It began "A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the sessions of the General Assembly." The fact that this new article clearly articulates suspension for political backsliding provides a clear example of a strengthened IGO commitment to democracy. This leads us to the first hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 1: IGO suspension after political backsliding is more likely in highly democratically committed IGOs.*

Furthermore, IGOs made up of more democratic members should have greater incentives to punish violator states for political backsliding.[59] The degree of democracy among members varies widely even within democratically committed IGOs. When more states are democratic in an IGO, more states may have an interest in coming forward to actually uphold and promote these norms. Furthermore, IGO commitments are backed up by democratic practices in more member states, rendering collective action more likely. When the IGO has a higher concentration of democratic member states, it is also more likely that more members care about compliance with democratic commitments in the IGO and are therefore more likely to work together to sanction an outlier state.[60] This leads to the second hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2: IGO suspension after political backsliding is more likely in densely democratic IGOs.*

[58] Available at `http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280154040` Accessed 15 December 2015.

[59] Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Pevehouse 2002a.

[60] Recently transitioned states are the most likely to care about the IGO's democratic character to uphold their state's hard earned democratic credibility. For example, in March 2005, the Ukraine withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent State's Election Monitoring Organization because it did not want to be associated with sham election monitoring (Kupchinsky 2005).

The willingness of member states to come together and suspend a political backslider is also likely to be affected by the geostrategic importance of the violator state. When the violator is politically significant to a key remaining member state, that state may be able to prevent suspension actions. A strong alliance relationship with the regional power in the IGO may insulate the violator from suspension: the regional power can flex its diplomatic strength, offer carrots and sticks to others in the organization in place of suspension, and potentially act as a veto player to reduce the suspension risk for the violator. In this way, the regional power can ensure that their diplomatic status quo is maintained for key friends. For example, after Zimbabwe's widely criticized 2007-2008 poll, the Kenyan prime minister, Raila Odinga, called on African leaders to suspend Zimbabwe from the Africa Union. But Mugabe's closeness with South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was largely seen as the reason Zimbabwe was protected from suspension.[61]

Hypothesis 3: IGO suspension is less likely when the violator is allied with the regional power.

2.2 IGOs that are "Able:" The Role of Institutional Design Constraints

The previous three hypotheses describe how the political "willingness" of IGO member states to suspend a violator affects the collective response of remaining IGO members. However, Ostrom (1990) has reinforced that the structure of an institution also determines a group's ability to overcome collective action challenges. One key institutional feature that affects the collective action necessary to suspend a state after political backsliding is the preference aggregation rules within the IGO or the "ability" of IGO member states to act. Three aggregation mechanisms should make member states more "able" to overcome collective action challenges: favorable voting rules, a moderate group size, and clearly defined suspension

[61] Available at `http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/30/zimbabwe.unitednations` Accessed 18 November 2015.

clauses. First, collective action is easier when voting rules specify lower thresholds to invoke a suspension. We therefore expect IGOs with simple majority rules to be more able to suspend violators than IGOs with more stringent rules, such as two-thirds or consensus minus one.

Hypothesis 4: IGO suspension after political backsliding is more likely with lower IGO voting thresholds.

A second fundamental premise of collective action theory is that larger groups can hinder collective action (Olson 1965). In IGOs with more members, more states need to mobilize to follow suspension procedures so we expect that larger IGOs are less able to suspend violators. Reiter (2001, 53) summarizes the theory articulated in both H4 and H5 in his discussion about NATO suspension for political backsliding. "The alliance's large membership further complicates efforts to expel a state from the North Atlantic Treaty. The most legally defensible strategy for ejecting a state would probably be by unanimous vote of the other members, given that Article 10 allows for new members to join by unanimous vote. Reaching a unanimous decision to expel a newly authoritarian East European state would be difficult, however, because other states may not agree that democratic reversal constitutes a sufficient condition for expulsion." On the other end of the extreme, fairly small organizations (e.g. 3 states) risk dissolution of the IGO because the suspension of one member transforms the IGO into a bilateral relationship.[62] We thus expect a curvilinear relationship, where moderately sized organizations are more likely to suspend members than either fairly small or fairly large organizations. This leads to the fifth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: IGO suspension after political backsliding is more likely in moderately-sized IGOs.

Finally, remaining members should be better able to come together and suspend a political backslider when written rules lay out the rules and process for doing so. This could

[62]Examples of organizations with only 3 states are the BeNeLux community, and the Economic Community of Great Lakes States (Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo).

be for several reasons. First, IGOs that have included provisions about suspension in their charter may have had more similar preferences about how and when suspension should occur at the time of their design. This may be associated with more homogeneous preferences for stronger punishments when norms are violated in practice. Second, IGOs with provisions for suspension in their charter may be linked with something else that is correlated with a greater likelihood to suspend in the first place. In these instances, the design of the institution (and presence of legal clauses about suspension) is probably not unrelated to the nature of the underlying cooperation challenge.[63] Third, legal clauses specifying the possibility of suspension may make suspension more likely because they provide member states a "road map" for appropriate procedures rather than ad hoc process. All three of these reasons illustrate how the design of an IGO through its written rules can affect the ability of states to come together and decide to suspend a backslider.

Hypothesis 6: IGO suspension after political backsliding is more likely when the charter contains a suspension clause.

3 Research Design

3.1 Universe of Cases, Unit of Analysis, and Dependent Variable

In order to understand the conditions under which IGOs are more likely to suspend political violators, we undertake a statistical analysis. We test our hypotheses with original data on IGO suspensions in response to political backsliding from 1980 to 2010 worldwide. While we have suspension data back to 1945, the timeframe of our analysis is limited by the availability of variables that influence political backsliding. Our unit of analysis is the IGO-member state-year. We source IGO data from the Correlates of War (COW-IGO) dataset.[64] In the interest of theoretical clarity and inferential validity, we compare relevant and similar IGOs

[63] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
[64] Pevehouse et al. 2004.

by focusing on suspensions from democratically committed IGOs – organizations that have agreed in their constitutive documents to uphold domestic political standards relating to democracy, human rights, or the rule of law.[65] This measure of democratically committed IGOs is time-varying: IGOs only enter the sample (or change values) when their charters adopt text articulating that the institution is democratically committed. Reflecting changes in international norms of democracy and human rights over time, the set of democratically committed organizations has grown from 18 in 1980 to 54 in 2010.[66] Table 1 illustrates this growth in democratically committed IGOs over time. Apart from serving as the sample for our analysis, these original data are an important contribution to deepening our understanding of international factors affecting democracy promotion. These data can stimulate further research in other areas, as elaborated in the conclusion.

TABLE 1 HERE

Our dependent variable is IGO suspension onset due to political backsliding for any given member state-year. We code an IGO-member state-year as 1 in suspension onset years, and 0 otherwise. This is because we are interested in what actions trigger member states coming together to invoke an IGO suspension, not what accounts for the length of a suspension. To give one example, Nigeria was under military rule since 1983 with democratic rights routinely being abridged, but it was not suspended from the Commonwealth Secretariat until 1995. This first-ever suspension for the Commonwealth was triggered when nine human rights campaigners were prosecuted for their alleged involvement in the slayings of four Ogoni tribe leaders (in May 1994). Their guilty verdict and death sentences were criticized by the international community for serious procedural irregularities.[67] When the accused

[65]See online appendix for coding criteria. Even primarily economic organizations in less democratic regions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) pay lip-service to democratic standards.

[66]This is 18 percent of 308 IGOs in the set of IGOs with active charters/websites in Correlates of War: 37 IGO charters refer to democracy, 40 to human rights, and 28 to rule of law (many charters mention more than one aspect).

[67]Magliveras 1999, 191.

were hanged despite strong international pressure to commute the sentences (on 10 November, the first day of the Auckland Commonwealth Summit), the remaining members came together and voted almost unanimously to suspend Nigeria's membership.[68] This suspension served as an international public condemnation of human rights abuses and was costly for Nigeria because it excluded the country from receiving any Commonwealth technical assistance and prevented government representatives from participating in inter-governmental Commonwealth meetings and events.[69] In our data, the Commonwealth-Nigeria-1995 cell therefore contains a "1" whereas all other years for the Commonwealth-Nigeria[70] contain "0s" (as that was the only instance of Nigeria being suspended from the Commonwealth).

To collect these original data on suspension, we searched a prominent media database (Factiva)[71] for each active IGO in the COW data. We used this database to search historical newspaper articles for key terms that would signal an IGO suspension had occurred. In particular, we combined each IGO name with terms such as "suspen", "exit", and "eject." Every single instance of an IGO suspension was cross-checked by finding the newspaper article outside of Factiva as well as by finding at least one supplementary article from a *different* media source.

We are confident that this procedure makes the resulting suspension dataset both consistent and virtually comprehensive. We also note that there is no incentive for a newspaper to wrongly indicate that an IGO suspension had occurred. In fact, the opposite holds: if IGOs are using suspensions to punish states then they have incentives to publicize their collective action to enhance future compliance. In other words, we should expect suspensions to be

[68] Available at `http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/12/world/commonwealth-suspends-nigeria-over-executions.html?_r=0` Accessed 14 December, 2015. The only dissenting vote was Gambia. Nigeria was re-admitted into the Commonwealth Secretariat on 29 May 1999.

[69] Available at `http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/nigeria-suspended-commonwealth#sthash.bLGb0DKp.dpuf` Accessed 14 December, 2015.

[70] Members of the Commonwealth Secretariat agreed to principles of democratic self-determination in the Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles in 1971. Available at `http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/singapore-declaration-commonwealth-principles` Accessed 14 December, 2015.

[71] Factiva is a Dow Jones & Company business information and research tool. It aggregates content from over 32,000 licensed and free sources including newspapers, journals, magazines, television and radio transcripts from nearly every country worldwide in 28 languages.

publicized. Moreover, we take extensive measures to reduce the chance of missing data from the Factiva database due to differences in language or media efforts.[72] In order to ensure that we have not systematically missed data that does not show up in the Factiva database, we also checked each organization's website for information about membership suspension over time and followed up via email to each IGO.[73] These extensive coding efforts leave us confidant that we have captured the full range of IGO suspensions due to political backsliding. Last, we note that if media are biased against publishing suspensions for small and moderately-sized IGOs because they do not deem the events newsworthy enough for publication, this only strengthens our findings (since we argue that moderately-sized IGOs are more likely to suspend).

3.2 Measuring IGO Characteristics: Willing and Able

To evaluate our hypotheses on IGO member states' "willingness" to suspend political backsliders, we include three variables that reflect the politics of collective action: the strength of the IGO's democratic commitment, the state's membership in more democratic IGOs, and the state's alliance with the regional power. The first variable, *IGO democratic commitment strength*, is a binary variable coded 0 when the IGO's democratic commitment is weak (i.e. only mentioned in an introductory or preamble clause as an aspirational value) and coded 1 when the commitment is strong (i.e. when it is mentioned in more places, with more details, or both).[74] We expect IGOs with a firmer democratic commitment to be more likely to suspend political backsliders. The variable *member in more democratic IGO* captures the highest democratic density among all of a country's IGO memberships. Following prior research,[75] we average the regime score of each IGO that country i is a member of in year

[72]For example, our searches are in English which might bias findings toward IGOs who primarily communicate in English. Second, our Factiva search might bias against small IGOs that lack a large communications office or media connection (or IGOs that the media deems less important to publicize).

[73]Further coding details are provided in the online appendix.

[74]Further coding details, including examples of each category, are found in the online appendix.

[75]The calculation follows Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b and uses polity2 data (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). This continuous measure of membership profile avoids imposing arbitrary cut-points for democracy.

j (excluding state i, the potential violator), and then select the highest IGO score for each member state-year. We expect that countries with membership in more democratic IGOs are more likely to be suspended than countries with membership in only less democratic organizations. The third variable capturing willingness is *allied with regional power*. This variable is coded 1 when a country was allied with a regional leader, and 0 otherwise. Regional powers include Brazil, South Africa, Germany, Russia, China and Australia.[76] We expect countries with powerful friends to be better able to insulate themselves from suspensions.

To examine our hypotheses on IGO member states' "ability" to suspend political backsliders, we utilize measures of the IGO's design including voting rules, membership size, and suspension clauses. These variables account for the institutional ease of collective action among remaining member states. Many IGOs have multiple voting rules depending on the nature of the issue area so we could not rely on a broad coding of the IGO's "general voting rule."[77] For example, it is often more difficult to vote to suspend a country than it is to agree on a new member. The variable *IGO suspension voting rule* is therefore the voting rule that is specifically associated with suspension. It is coded 0.9 for consensus minus one, 0.67 for two-thirds majority and qualified majority, and 0.5 for simple majority.[78] We expect that IGOs with more lenient voting rules will be more able to suspend a political backslider. The variable *IGO size* indicates the number of member states in each IGO-year, ranging from 3 to 189. As detailed above, we expect a curvilinear effect where large organizations find it more difficult to overcome collective action challenges, and small organizations are

A simpler variable, IGO's average democracy score, points in the same direction.

[76] Alliance data is sourced from Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012; Leeds 2005. To test the robustness of this hypothesis, we also alternatively use member state natural resources, noting that this is another proxy for the geostrategic importance of the violator state. These models are included in the supplementary material to be posted online.

[77] See Blake and Payton for broad voting rule data across many IGOs.

[78] We also code 0.5 for IGOs in which the voting rule is mentioned in the Charter but unclear, ostensibly automatic, a "special" vote, or triggered from another organization. No voting rule for suspension is specified in about half the observations, reducing the sample size for these models. We attempted to reduce missing values in two ways. First, we looked to general voting rule data (Blake and Payton 2014) but the extent of missing data mirrored ours. Second, we searched IGO Rules of Procedure for voting rules, but this proved unworkable due to the lack of common structure of these documents across IGOs. Further coding details are in the online appendix.

reluctant to suspend members for fear of organizational survival, so that suspension might occur in moderately sized IGOs. To test this curvilinear effect, we include a quadratic term, IGO size squared, alongside the constitutive term (raw count of *IGO size*). We expect the squared term to be negative, indicating an inverted u-shape relationship between IGO size and the probability of suspension. Last, we draw on our original data to compile *IGO clause on suspension.* It is coded 1 when the IGO contains such a clause in the IGO charter and 0 otherwise. In the group of "democratically committed" IGOs, 35 percent of organizations (19 of 54) have specific charter clauses mentioning the possibility of suspension. We expect IGOs with suspension clauses to be more likely to suspend political backsliders.

3.3 Model and Control Variables

IGO member-states suspensions for political backsliding will only be observed if states politically backslide in the first place. This creates a sample selection issue. We therefore run Heckman probit models to account for this sample selection and the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.[79] These sample selection models estimate the determinants of IGO suspension while accounting for the process that leads to political backsliding in the first stage. In other words, our models address which IGOs are more likely to suspend which states for political backsliding, given that political backsliding has occurred. Confirming the theoretical reasoning for a selection model, Wald tests of the correlation coefficient are consistently significant, indicating that the error terms of the first and second stage equations are related, so that a two-stage model is appropriate.[80]

In the first stage, we model the likelihood of a state in an IGO to politically backslide in any given year. The dependent variable, *political backsliding,* is binary and intended to closely map provisions mentioned in democracy, human rights, and rule of law clauses in IGO charters. To capture this phenomenon, we include data on (1) human rights violations

[79]Heckman 1979.

[80]In the robustness section, we present a number of follow-up analyses using single-stage models, rare events models, and sub-sample analyses (restricting the sample to backsliding country-years). Our results are robust to these changes.

and (2) non-democratic events in the form of coups d'état, election issues, and states of emergency. The first backsliding measure, human rights violations, is a binary indicator coded 1 for a single or multiple point reduction in human rights standards compared to the prior year.[81] Backsliding in terms of non-democratic events is coded 1 for successful coups d'état,[82] election issues[83] – unacceptable election quality, major election problems, government harassment of the opposition – and national political states of emergency.[84] Combining these measures, the variable *Political backsliding* is coded 1 when one or more of these political regressions occurred, that is, in the year a country retreats from agreed-upon democratic standards, and zero otherwise. Of the full sample, more than 50 percent of IGO-country-years experience no backsliding, while almost 30 percent experience human rights violations, 25 percent have states of emergency, 7 percent have serious election irregularities, and 1 percent have coups d'état.

To predict political backsliding in the first stage, we use a set of standard covariates identified in prior research:[85] *democracy* (polity2); *age of democracy* in years and *effective number of parties* (both logged);[86] *member state natural resources per capita* (logged and in constant USD);[87] *GDP per capita* (logged) and *GDP growth.*[88] All predictor variables are lagged by one year to mitigate endogeneity.[89]

In the second stage, we predict IGO suspensions for political backsliding and include a range of controls in addition to our key variables of interest. The control variables are

[81] We use the physical integrity index (Cingranelli and Richards 2013) and the political terror scale (Gibney and Dalton 2013), which are coded on a five-point scale from the same source (Amnesty International and State Dept. human rights reports) but at times have different missing values. While a one-point change could be a small change from the previous year, we note that these human rights values tend to be sticky (Clark and Sikkink 2013) and therefore, small changes induce substantive differences.

[82] Marshall and Marshall 2012, 1.

[83] Kelley 2010, 4-5; Hyde and Marinov 2011.

[84] Hafner-Burton, Helfer, Fariss 2011.

[85] Gasiorowski 1995; Goldstone et al. 2010.

[86] Keefer 2012.

[87] Ross 2012.

[88] World Bank 2012.

[89] We include additional control variables in the robustness section, including whether the state has a presidential or parliamentary system and the state's ethnic fractionalization. The inclusion of these additional controls do not change our results.

measured at the IGO, the region, and the state level. At the IGO level, the success of collective action may also be influenced by the IGO's geographic dispersion of member states. In contrast to organizations spanning several continents, regional organizations tend to have a greater sense of community, potentially higher reputational and contagion costs for pariah states, and are more selective clubs,[90] making regional organizations potentially more likely to suspend backsliding states. *Regional IGO* is coded 1 when all members are geographically located in the same region, i.e. Africa, Asia, Americas, Europe, or Pacific.

At the regional level, we control for the level of democracy and development. *Regional democracy score* is the average regime score[91] (lagged by a year) of all members per region-year. *Regional development score* is the average per capita GDP of all members per region-year[92] (lagged and logged). We also include a dummy variable, *Post-Cold War*, which captures an increased willingness of IGOs to engage in democracy promotion and punish backsliding after 1990, as illustrated in Figure 1.

At the country-level, we control for *population size*[93] (lagged and logged), which might influence both alliance status and suspension. The robustness tests include a battery of further control variables (explained below), with the main results largely unaffected. Summary statistics for all variables are in Table 2.

TABLE 2 HERE

In each of the Heckman probit models, we use standard errors clustered by IGO to account for the lack of independence of observations within IGOs.[94] This accounts for the fact that once an IGO has suspended a member state for political backsliding, it might be more likely to suspend other states.[95] In the robustness tests, we also run the same models on several subsets of data: (1) only post 1990 due to the fact that the end of the Cold War might have

[90]Pevehouse 2002a.
[91]Polity2 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010.
[92]World Bank 2012.
[93]World Bank 2012.
[94]Results are qualitatively similar if we cluster on country instead.
[95]In the robustness checks, we include a specific variable for the history of suspension at any given IGO too.

systematically shifted IGO behavior on political norms, (2) only backsliding countries (i.e. using a sample restriction in a one stage model), and (3) separating out different types of backsliding (human rights violations versus non-democratic violations), and (4) a single stage rare events logit. The results are robust and qualitatively similar. We detail our findings below.

4 Results

Table 3 presents results for both stages of the selection models. Our first stage results predicting backsliding itself are in line with previous research: we find that countries that are more democratic, more developed, have more political parties, and are more prosperous are significantly less likely to politically backslide. Also consistent with previous research, we find that countries are *more* likely to regress politically when they strongly rely on oil and gas. Interestingly, those countries that have been democratic longer seem to be associated with a greater likelihood of backsliding, but this coefficient is not consistently significant.

TABLE 3 HERE

Table 3 also shows the second stage results, predicting IGO suspensions for political backsliding, and provides strong support for our theoretical argument about the importance of collective action. In Models 1 through 6, we test each of our key hypotheses individually. Models 1 through 3 show results for the measures of "willingness", and Models 4 through 6 for measures of IGO "ability." Model 7 is effectively a horse race, with all key independent variables included at the same time. In other words, Models 2 and 3 speak to differences between member states that presumably deserve to be punished; and Models 1 and 4-6 speak to differences across IGOs that might influence the suspension decision, given the same country-year.

Overall, Table 3 provides strong support for the argument that suspensions for political backsliding are more likely when IGOs are more "willing and able" to overcome collective

action challenges. All coefficient estimates are in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant. The only exception is *IGO clause on suspension,* which we discuss below.

The first measure of IGO willingness, *strength of democratic commitment,* is significantly associated with an increased probability of suspension, as shown in model 1 of Table 3. All else equal, violators in strongly committed IGOs have a 5 percentage point higher risk of being suspended than violators in weakly committed IGOs.[96] This change in the predicted probability of suspension is illustrated in Figure 3. The coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant ($p<0.01$). One illustrative example of this dynamic is Madagascar after its 2009 coup d'état: the country was suspended from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which has a strong commitment to democracy[97] but not the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), an IGO with a weaker commitment to democracy.

FIGURE 3 HERE

With regard to IGO willingness, countries which are members of more democratically dense organizations have a 9 percentage point higher risk of suspension than violators with memberships in less democratic IGOs, as shown in model 2 of Table 3.[98] The coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant ($p<0.01$). One example of a country's differential risk of being suspended due to its membership in more democratic organizations is Turkey versus Tunisia. Both experienced a coup d'état in the 1980s, but only Turkey was suspended (from the Council of Europe).[99] At the time, Turkey's most democratic IGO had an average democracy score of 8.5 (on the 21-point Polity scale) while Tunisia's was significantly lower, at -1.2, generating less pressure for suspension.

[96] All substantive effects (changes in predicted probabilities of suspension) are estimated with all remaining variables held at their mean, and Figures show 95% confidence intervals.

[97] See online appendix for coding decisions on IGO strength of commitment to democracy.

[98] The substantive effect is calculated from model 2 in Table 3 with a change in the full range of actual values (from -3 to 10), as illustrated in Figure 3.

[99] Available at `http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2006/1/9/f9b31f98-f1a1-407c-97ad-7e92363117fd/publishable\_en.pdf` Accessed 15 December, 2015.

The third proxy for IGO willingness, *allied with regional power,* is negatively associated with suspension. As expected, countries which are allied with important players are able to insulate themselves somewhat from international pressures like suspension. Such an alliance is associated with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in the probability of suspension. While the average extent of this insulation seems relatively minor compared to the other factors we have identified, it can be quite important for countries at the margin. For example, as Reiter (2001: 54) explains, "democratic members of the alliance may prefer to retain a "useful" alliance member even if it is autocratic. This explains why neither Greece nor Turkey was ejected from or even sanctioned by NATO when they reverted to autocratic rule."

In addition to member states' willingness, the IGO's ability to generate punishment – or its institutional design constraints – also matters. As hypothesized, less stringent voting rules for suspension tend to ease collective action. The coefficient on this variable in model 4 is positive and significant ($p < 0.05$). IGOs with simple majority rules are about 3 percentage points more likely to suspend violators than organizations with a consensus rule. An illustrative case is Caricom's suspension of Haiti following the deposition of democratically elected Aristide in 2004. Caricom's simple majority rule provided a lower threshold than the two-thirds supermajority vote required in the OAS (which did not suspend Haiti).[100] However, these estimates are based on fewer data points, and for the typical case in the data, these effects are not strongly significant (see Figure 3).

As expected from our collective action logic, *IGO size* can also pose an important impediment to suspension. The coefficient on the squared term is negative and highly significant ($p < 0.01$) in model 5 of Table 3. Specifically, organizations with moderately sized membership (between 30 and 50 states) are up to 7 percentage points more likely to suspend violators than smaller or larger organizations. As an example of this dynamic, consider Honduras after the coup d'état that ousted President Manuel Zelaya. On 5 July 2009, all 33 members

[100]The OAS Charter, Chapter 3, Article 9 states "The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a special session of the General Assembly by an affirmative vote of 2/3 of the Member States."

of the OAS voted for Honduras' suspension.[101] Honduras was not, however, suspended from the much larger United Nations.

An additional design feature expected to be consequential is whether the IGO charter specifically mentions suspension. The estimated coefficient points in the hypothesized direction, being positively associated with suspensions but far from statistical significance. This finding is contrary to expectations based on rational design premises.[102] In practice, IGOs still suspend states for political backsliding when the possibility of suspension has not been formally documented in the IGO charter. For example, the OSCE and the Pacific Island Forum have suspended violator states without having legal suspension provisions in their Charters. This suspension practice despite the lack of legal provisions highlights the importance of informal governance[103] as well as how IGOs can expand beyond their original mandate.[104]

The control variables behave as expected. Only three control variables consistently reach statistical significance. Suspensions for political backsliding are more likely from regional organizations (which have increasingly adopted democracy clauses), in more democratic regions, and more likely since the end of the Cold War.

In summary, the empirical analyses provide strong support of our argument that IGO suspension is more likely when member states are more willing and able to overcome collective action challenges to suspend political backsliders. In terms of willingness, organizations that are more committed to democracy are more likely to suspend violating member states; states that are members of more democratic IGOs (rather than only less democratic organizations) are more likely to be suspended. However, those states in an alliance with a regional hegemon tend to be insulated from the risk of IGO punishment. Together these findings point to distinct political interactions in mobilization of remaining member states. In terms of the ability to suspend, size matters: organizations with a membership between

[101] Thompson and Lacey 2009.
[102] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
[103] Stone 2011.
[104] Barnett and Finnemore 2004.

30 and 50 states are significantly more likely to suspend members than larger organizations (which find collective action more challenging) or smaller organizations (with might fear dissolution). Voting rules within the IGO also seem to matter, as organizations with simple majority rules are more likely to suspend members than organizations with super-majority or consensus rules. With the exception of voting rules, our results are robust to a number of changes in model specification and additional control variables, which we describe in the following section.

5 Robustness Tests

We conduct three sets of robustness checks on our main analyses: adding further controls, restricting the sample in time and type of violation, and changing the model specification. The results are largely unaffected and the substantive interpretation is very similar.

First, we add further controls to the analysis in Table 3 at the IGO and country-level. For the second stage, these include whether the IGO has first-hand experience *observing elections* in that country-year,[105] whether the IGO had a *history of suspensions,* whether bilateral *economic sanctions* were imposed,[106] and the *backsliding degree* (the yearly negative point changes in the polity2 scale). To the first stage predicting backsliding, we add ethnic fractionalization,[107] a variable for presidential *systems,*[108] and whether the country was *member of a more democratic IGO,* an IGO with high *democratic commitment strength,* or an organization with *suspension rules.* The first two variables are added because previous scholarship on backsliding has discussed their potential relevance[109] and the latter are second stage variables from the main analysis which might also influence backsliding itself.[110] The

[105]Hyde and Marinov 2011.

[106]Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2013. We include economic sanctions to account for the most common and important alternative choice on the sanctions "menu." The results suggest that economic sanctions often accompany suspensions. From our reading of cases, suspensions seem to precede economic sanctions, potentially acting as a trigger for further international punishment.

[107]Finkel et al 2007.

[108]Keefer 2012.

[109]Reenock et al 2013.

[110]However, the empirical analyses suggest that domestic political backsliding (the first stage outcome)

results are shown in Online Appendix Table 1. With one exception, all of our results from the main analysis (Table 3) are robust to including more control variables. The exception is the voting rules variable, which still points in the hypothesized direction but falls short of statistical significance. As noted above, this may be due to missing data.

Second, we restrict our sample in two different ways: in time and in political backsliding events. We re-run the main analysis (Table 3) for the post-Cold War period (1990-2010) and also include a year variable. The post-1990 analysis accounts for the fact that international efforts to promote and enforce domestic political standards have deepened in recent years, particularly in the wake of "Responsibility to Protect" mantras. Kelley (2013: 80) argues, for example, that OAS "membership rules have grown more club-like over time; the membership criteria have hardened, making suspension and interference more likely. Yet these changes were gradual and only decades of changes in domestic conditions led to a move away from strict non-intervention." In line with this notion, there is a strong time trend in the data, as the newly included year variable is positive and statistically significant. This confirms the finding from Figure 1 that the use of suspensions has strongly increased over time. These results are shown in Online Appendix Table 2. These changes reduce the significance of the voting rules and alliance variables. All other results are robust in the post-1990 period.

We also re-run the analysis from Table 3 by restricting the sample to actual cases of political backsliding events. That is, we switch from the two-stage selection model to simple probit models on only the subset of country-years which have regressed in their human rights or democracy standards. Note that this sampling restriction leads to a much smaller sample size, but all the findings from the main analysis are robust to this change. Finally, we further divide the sample into those backsliding cases related to human rights violations and those relating to non-democratic events because IGOs may have different logics for human rights violations versus other political backsliding. For example, one might suspect

is not influenced by membership in an IGO with suspension rules or strong democratic commitment. This suggests that governments are not deterred from backsliding by these IGO features but if governments backslide, these features drive the likelihood of suspension.

that coups d'état are far more likely to lead to IGO suspension than either human rights violations or election-related violations because coups are more egregious. An example of a suspension due to an egregious human rights violation occurred when the Council of Europe suspended Russia in 2000 after it allegedly committed human rights violations in Chechnya.[111] Thus this analysis focuses on sub-types of backsliding and assesses differences across violator states: whether, for example, focusing only on human rights violations, states with key alliance partners (or with a more democratic membership profile) have a different probability of suspension than human rights violating states without key alliance partners (or with a less democratic membership profile). The other Models (1, 4-6) speak to differences across IGOs given the same violating behavior. The results of the sample restriction are in Online Appendix Table 3. All of our results from the main analysis are robust to restricting the sample to backsliding cases.

Lastly, we also take into account that suspensions are rare; they occur in less than 1 percent of observations, which potentially raises the concern of biased estimates. To address this concern, we replicate the main analysis with rare-events logit models.[112] The rare event model specification is identical to the second stage in Table 3 but also controls for the probability of backsliding (using predictions from the first stage). These results are in Online Appendix Table 4. The interpretation is quite similar to the main analysis; however, the coefficient on the voting rule variable falls short of statistical significance ($p < 0.14$).

Overall, our results are fairly robust to the changes in specification, modeling, and sampling, providing strong support for our collective action argument about IGOs' "willingness and ability" to punish violators. The coefficients are consistently significant again with the exception of suspension clause and voting rules and remain in the hypothesized direction.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLES 1-4 HERE

[111] Available at http://www.economist.com/node/12288477/print. Accessed April 14, 2015.
[112] King and Zeng 2001.

6 Conclusion

There is a large literature emphasizing the role of IGOs as commitment devices in democratization.[113] This body of work rests on the plausible but rarely tested assumption that IGO membership suspension can act as a stick to punish would-be violators. States that fail to uphold commitments to democracy, human rights, and rule of law stand to lose their membership privileges through suspension, raising the costs of political backsliding. These theoretical premises have supported models of international organizations and democratization for decades but heretofore have not been examined in practice. We examine the conditions under which IGOs suspend states for political backsliding and explain why suspensions are both rare and uneven. Focusing on political backsliding is crucial given that this is the trigger for the majority of IGO suspensions.

We argue that collective action challenges among remaining member states are largely responsible for the variation in IGO suspensions for political backsliding. Member states need to mobilize if they want to suspend and therefore they have to be both "willing and able" to suspend states that violate domestic political norms. IGO member states are more "willing" to overcome collective action challenges and push to suspend political backsliders in highly committed and densely democratic IGOs. In these IGOs, domestic political norms are more salient and cause less of a collective action hurdle for members to come together and act. Several legal scholars argue that this is unfortunate because 'IGO violations are black and white,' and 'clearly defined in international law.'[114] But as with most areas of international relations, the empirical record of IGO suspensions shows that political preferences and shared democratic standards can affect the collective action process necessary to execute legal standards, pointing to the gap between IGO laws and practices.[115] Furthermore, the geostrategic importance of the violator state is crucial: when the violator is allied

[113]Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Poast and Urpelainen 2013; Snidal 1985; Moravcsik 2000; Donno 2013.

[114]Magliveras 1999.

[115]Adler and Pouliot 2011; Pouliot 2008.

with the regional power, it is far less likely to be suspended for political backsliding. This shows that institutions do not treat all members evenly because decisions are largely a result of member-state politics.

IGO member states are also more "able" to overcome collective action challenges and suspend political backsliders when institutional design rules are favorable. When voting rules for suspension are less stringent and when IGOs are moderate in size, institutional hurdles to collective action are lower. These findings reinforce prior research showing that IGOs are heterogeneous,[116] and that shared norms and design constraints influence institutional outcomes.[117] In line with recent research on informal governance arguments,[118] suspension clauses are not important for IGO suspension practice. Instead, IGO member states figure out when to improvise, and how to expand beyond the mandate of their institution when needed.[119] To be sure, important states are less likely to be suspended from IGOs for politically backsliding, but examples in our paper – including Russia's suspension from the Council of Europe in 2000, Turkey's suspension from the Council of Europe in 1980, and Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth Secretariat – are but a few cases that emphasize not only that it happens but that it is costly.

These findings are significant for international relations research on international democracy promotion, targeted sanctions, IGO design, and IGO practices. First, we broaden work on democratic enforcement through IGOs to examine the strategies that member states use to punish a state that has veered off course. Second, we expand work on targeted sanctions to include IGO suspension in the sanctioning menu, which has largely been ignored in prior work. Third, we extend institutional design research beyond the traditional features recognized in the literature and focus on an IGO's charter commitment to democratic principles. Fourth, we focus on the practice of suspension to bolster previous theoretical underpinnings about the importance of states tying their hands through IGO membership.

[116]Boehmer, Gartzke, Nordstrom 2004; Karreth and Tir 2013.
[117]Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal 2001.
[118]Stone 2011.
[119]Barnett and Finnemore 2004.

Underscoring each of these contributions is an extensive original data that we introduce on IGO suspensions as well as the articulated democratic commitment of IGOs.

This paper opens many opportunities for further examination of IGO suspensions in the wake of political backsliding. First, future research can examine the effectiveness of IGO suspensions after political backsliding. Are suspended countries more likely to change their domestic political behavior than countries that are not suspended for similar democratic incursions? Furthermore, are there unintended consequences of IGO suspensions following political backsliding?

Second, future research could formally test the notion that IGOs are more likely to suspend political backsliders when member states are concerned about maintaining the organization's legitimacy and reputation. For example, interlocutors argued "the action [of the African Union] against Egypt is part of a greater campaign to win the organization more legitimacy as an able problem solver on the continent."[120] Furthermore, the IGO's internal culture and informal rules may matter in determining how member states resolve their disagreements and what kind of punishments they use. A more detailed empirical test of this hypothesis is necessary.

Third, researchers can use our original data on democratically committed IGOs to further understand the heterogeneity of IGO designs and practices. How do member states agree on including the language of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in their constitutive documents? In what other ways do democratically committed IGOs differ from other IGOs beyond their frequency in suspending countries for political backsliding?

More broadly, it is worth remembering that Henkin famously argued that "almost all [IGO] members observe almost all their obligations almost all of the time."[121] We have shown that when member states do violate their IGO obligations to domestic political standards – like human rights norms and expectations for democracy – remaining member states use suspension as a targeted diplomatic sanction against an increasing number of violator states.

[120]Patel 2013.
[121]Henkin 1979, 47.

Figures

Figure 1: IGO Suspensions over time



Figure 2: IGO Suspensions across IGOs, 1980-2010
(some countries get suspended from multiple IGOs for same violation)



Figure 3: Substantive Effects on the Probability of IGO Suspensions



Tables

Table 1: Democratically Committed IGOs

IGO Acronym	IGO name	Earliest commitment year
OAS	Pan-Am Union/Org of Am States	1948
WEU	Western European Union	1948
ECSC	European Coal & Steel Community	1951
UN	United Nations	1945
ILO	Intl Labour Org	1919
INCAP	Instit Nutrition for Cent Am & Pan	1949
INTERPOL	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1956
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Org	1949
AP	Andean Parliament	1979
OIC	Org. Islamic Conference	1974
COE	Council of Europe	1949
ICCS	Intl Comm on Civil Status	1952
UNESCO	UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org	1945
ComSec	Commonwealth Secretariat	1971
WTOURO	World Tourism Org.	1970
BENELUX	Benelux Community	1958
SEAMEO	Southeast Asian Minist. of Educ. Org.	1968
IADefB	Inter-American Defense Board	1942
OECS	Org. Eastern Caribbean States	1981
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	1983
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	1989
Andean	Andean Pact	1989
CEI	Central European Initiative	1989
OSCE	Org. Security Cooperation Europe	1990
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction & Development	1991
SICA	Central American Integration System	1991
CEFTA	Central Europe FTA	1992
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Council	1992
SADC	Southern African Dev. Community	1992
ACP	ACP Group	1992
FDIPLAC	Fund 4 Devel. of Indigen Peoples of LA/Carib	1992
EU	European Union	1988
OESAS	Observatorie economique statistique sub-saharan Afr.	1993
GEF	Global Environ. Fund	1991
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1994
COMESA	Comm Market for East/South Africa	1993
ACS	Association of Caribbean States	1994
CEMAC	Central African Economic & Monetary Union	1994
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1995
CPSC	Comm Portugese Speaking Countries	1996
Mercosur	MERCOSUR	1998
RIOgroup	Rio Group	1999
ACPEU	ACP/EU Joint Assembly	2000
PIF	Pacific Island Forum	2000
EACS	Sec. for the Commission for East Afr. Coop.	2001
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	2001
PAP	Pan-African Parliament	2000
ICC	International Criminal Court	1998
AU	African Union	2000
SACU	Southern African CU	2002
CICA	Conf. on Interaction & Confidence-Building Measures in Asia	2002
SEGIB	Ibero-American General Secretariat	2003
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons	2000
ACCT	Francophone Agency	2005
CEPGL	Economic Community of Great Lakes States	2006
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	2007

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Suspension due to political backsliding	0.001	0.025	0	1	45689
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.285	0.452	0	1	45689
Member in more democratic IGO	7.329	2.284	-3.488	10	40759
IGO size squared	16218.566	13091.639	9	35721	45689
IGO clause on suspension	0.365	0.482	0	1	45689
IGO voting rule	0.556	0.090	0.5	0.9	21512
Regional IGO	0.167	0.373	0	1	45689
Regional democracy score	3.102	4.758	-5.881	9.278	45689
Regional development score	8.698	1.103	6.988	10.279	45689
Post Cold War	0.780	0.414	0	1	45689
Population size (logged)	15.679	1.849	9.888	21.009	45376
Member natural resources pc (logged)	-1.469	7.036	-9.210	11.147	43078
GDP pc (logged)	7.958	1.613	3.913	11.674	43033
GDP growth	3.522	6.341	-51.031	149.973	43306
Democracy	2.762	6.931	-10	10	40744
Age of democracy (logged)	1.860	1.459	0	4.394	45665
Effective number of parties (logged)	0.783	0.439	0	3.932	45665
Political backsliding	0.339	0.473	0	1	45689
Political backsliding degree	-0.131	1.580	-16	15	40680
Type: Human rights violations	0.294	0.456	0	1	45301
Type: non-democratic events	0.299	0.458	0	1	45689
Type: coups	0.011	0.105	0	1	44949
Type: election issues	0.070	0.255	0	1	45689
Type: states of emergency	0.253	0.435	0	1	45689
IGO institutionalization low	0.371	0.483	0	1	38840
IGO institutionalization medium	0.321	0.467	0	1	38840
IGO institutionalization high	0.308	0.462	0	1	38840
IGO observed elections	0.015	0.122	0	1	45689
Allied with regional power	0.293	0.455	0	1	45689
Economic sanction	0.070	0.255	0	1	45689
Ethnic fractionalization	0.444	0.255	0.001	0.944	44179
Political system	1.192	0.934	0	2	43936

Table 3: Determinants of IGO Suspensions for Political Backsliding, 1980-2010

	Willing			Able			Unified model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Stage 2: Suspension							
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.709						0.341
	(0.230)***						(0.193)*
Member in more democratic IGO		0.140					0.152
		(0.030)***					(0.034)***
Allied with regional power			-0.314				-0.340
			(0.128)**				(0.117)***
IGO voting rule				-2.051			
				(0.911)**			
IGO size					0.049		0.033
					(0.019)**		(0.015)**
IGO size squared					-0.001		-0.000
					(0.000)***		(0.000)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.108	0.047
						(0.185)	(0.146)
Regional IGO	0.310	0.411	0.491	0.992	0.224	0.438	0.204
	(0.205)	(0.181)**	(0.208)**	(0.253)***	(0.216)	(0.170)***	(0.152)
Regional democracy score	0.035	0.020	0.053	0.005	0.048	0.045	0.024
	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.019)***	(0.056)	(0.023)**	(0.017)**	(0.021)
Regional development score	-0.011	-0.108	-0.045	0.050	-0.084	-0.062	-0.092
	(0.081)	(0.062)*	(0.076)	(0.166)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.053)*
Post Cold War	0.177	0.169	0.091	0.371	0.138	0.192	0.067
	(0.154)	(0.091)*	(0.070)	(0.147)**	(0.149)	(0.111)*	(0.068)
Population size (logged)	-0.006	-0.030	0.001	0.065	-0.001	0.000	-0.037
	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.018)**
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
GDP growth	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
GDP pc (logged)	-0.198	-0.198	-0.198	-0.173	-0.198	-0.198	-0.198
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.023)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***
Member natural resources pc (logged)	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.009	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Democracy	-0.024	-0.024	-0.024	-0.022	-0.024	-0.024	-0.024
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Age of democracy (logged)	0.018	0.018	0.018	-0.002	0.018	0.018	0.018
	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.018)	(0.007)**	(0.007)***	(0.007)**
Effective number of parties (logged)	-0.158	-0.157	-0.158	-0.127	-0.158	-0.158	-0.156
	(0.025)***	(0.025)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.025)***	(0.025)***
Observations	38185	38154	38185	27933	38185	38185	38154
AIC	49515.39	49517.08	49547.72	33392.79	49509.97	49551.72	49467.98
BIC	49643.64	49645.32	49675.98	33516.35	49646.77	49679.97	49638.97
Rho	-0.745	-0.800	-0.676	-0.697	-0.718	-0.672	-0.858
Pr(chi2)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Heckman probit models with standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

References

Abbott, K. W., and Snidal, Duncan. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.

Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot, eds. 2011. *International Practices.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

African Union. 2013a. "Communique of the 363rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR)" March 25 2013.

African Union. 2013b. "Communique of the 362nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR)" March 23 2013.

African Union. 2013c. Communique of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 384th meeting on the situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt. July 5 2013.

African Union. 2014. "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 442nd meeting on the situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt." 17 June 2014.

Bapat, Navan, and Clifton Morgan. 2009. Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions reconsidered: A test using new data. *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (4): 1075-1094.

Barnett, M., and Finnemore, M. 2004. *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics.* Cornell University Press.

Biersteker, Thomas, Sue Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho. 2015. *Targeted Sanctions: The Effectiveness of UN Action.* Cambridge: CUP.

Blake, Daniel J. and Payton, Autumn Lockwood. 2014. Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations. *Review of International Organizations.*

Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics* 57 (1): 1-38.

Busse, Matthias, and Carsten Hefeker. 2007. Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment. *European journal of political economy* 23 (2): 397-415.

Cameron, Iain. 2003. UN targeted sanctions, legal safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights. *Nordic Journal of International Law* 72 (2):159-214.

Charnovitz, Steve. 2001. Rethinking WTO trade sanctions. *American Journal of International Law* 792-832.

Cingranelli, David, and David Richards, Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 407-417.

Clark, A., and Kathryn Sikkink. 2013. Information effects and human rights data: Is the good news about increased human rights information bad news for human rights measures? *Human Rights Quarterly* 35 (3):539-568.

Donno, Daniela. 2010. Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms. *International Organization* 64: 593-625.

——. 2013. *Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Doxey, Margaret. 1971. *Economic sanctions and international enforcement.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Drezner, Dan. 2003. *Locating the proper authorities: The interaction of domestic and international institutions.* University of Michigan Press.

——. 2011. Sanctions sometimes smart: targeted sanctions in theory and practice. *International Studies Review* 13 (1): 96-108.

Finkel, Steven E., Andrew Green, Anibal Perez-Linan, Mitchell A. Seligson, and C. Neal Tate. 2008. Cross-National Research on USAID's Democracy and Governance Programs - Codebook (Phase II). Available at `http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html` Accessed 5 January 2012.

Gasiorowski, Mark. 1995. Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 89 (4): 882897.

Gibney, M., Cornett, L., Wood, R., and Haschke, P. 2013. Political Terror Scale 1976-2012. Available at `http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/` Accessed 3 July 2013.

Gleditsch, Kristian, and Michael Ward. 2006. Diffusion and the international context of democratization. *International Organization* 60(4):911-933.

Goldstone, Jack A, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. A Global Mode for Forecasting Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 190-208.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, and Christopher Fariss. 2011. Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties. *International Organization* 65: 673-707.

Hardin, Russell. 1971. Collective action as an agreeable n?prisoners' dilemma. *Behavioral Science* 16 (5): 472-481.

——. 1982. *Collective action.* Baltimore: Resources for the Future.

Hazelzet, Hadewych. 2005. Suspension of Development Cooperation: An Instrument to Promote Human Rights and Democracy? Contonou Article 96; Discussion Paper 64B. The European Centre for Development Policy Management.

Heckman, J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. *Econometrica* 47L: 153-161.

Hellquist, Elin. 2014. Punishment at Home and Abroad: The Duality in the European Union's Approach to Sanctions. Working paper.

Henkin, Louis. 1979. *How Nations Behave*, 2nd edition. New York: Praeger.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2012. Penn World Table Version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Hufbauer, Gary, and Barbara Oegg. 2000. Targeted sanctions: A policy alternative. *Law and Policy in International Business* 32/11.

Human Rights Watch. "Hungary: Rule of Law Under Threat." 16 May 2013. Available at `http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/16/hungary-rule-law-under-threat` Accessed 23 October 2014.

Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 2011. Which elections can be lost? *Political Analysis.*

Isaac, R., J. Walker, and S. Thomas. 1984. Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. *Public choice* 43 (2): 113-149.

Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment. *International organization* 57 (3): 587-616.

Karreth, Johannes, and Tir, Jaroslav. 2013. International Institutions and Civil War Prevention. *Journal of Politics* 75 (1): 96-109.

Keefer, Philip. 2012. Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions. Development Research Group, World Bank.

Kelley, Judith. 2010. Quality of Elections Data (QED) Codebook. Available at http://sites.duke.edu/kelley/files/2011/05/CodebookQED.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2012.

——. 2012. Monitoring Democracy. *When International Election Observation Works, and Why it Often Fails.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

——. 2013. The Potential for Organizational Membership Rules to Enhance Regional Cooperation. In *Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative Context*, edited by Kahler, M., and A. MacIntyre. Stanford University Press.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton.

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis* 9: 137-163.

Koremenos, Barbara., Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International organization* 55 (4): 761-799.

Kupchinsky, Roman. 2005. "CIS: Monitoring The Election Monitors," 1 April 2005. Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp040205.shtml. Accessed 28 January 2014.

Lebovic, James H., and Erik Voeten. 2009. The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators. *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (1): 79-97.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2005. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Dataset. Rice University.

Levitsky, S., and Lucan Way. 2005. International linkage and democratization. *Journal of democracy* 16 (3): 20-34.

Magliveras, Konstantinos. 1999. *Exclusion from Participation in International Organisations: The Law and Practice Behind Member States' Expulsion and Suspension of Membership.* Boston: Kluwer.

Magliveras, Konstantinos, and Naldi, G. J. 2002. The African Union – A New Dawn for Africa? *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 51 (2): 415-425.

Maller, T. 2010. Diplomacy derailed: The consequences of diplomatic sanctions. *The Washington Quarterly* 33 (3): 61-79.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. *International Organization* 60 (1): 137-167.

——. 2008. Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 269-294.

Marshall G. 1998. *A dictionary of sociology.* Oxford University Press, New York.

Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2011. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Dataset Users' Manual. Center for Systemic Peace. College Park: University of Maryland. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf. Accessed 20 June 2012.

Marshall, Monty, and Donna Marshall. Coups d'etat Events, 1946-2011 Codebook. Center for Systemic Peace. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. Accessed 2 November 2012.

Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. *World Politics* 45 (3): 406-432.

Moravcsik, A. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization* 54 (2): 217-252.

Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi. 2013. Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data 4.0.

Morgan, Clifton, Navin Bapat, and V. Krustev. 2009. The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(1):92-110.

Murithi, T. 2007. Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Union values and principles into policy and practice. Institute for Security Studies Papers (143): 16.

Murdie, Amanda M., and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56: 1-16.

Nossal, K. R. 1989. International sanctions as international punishment. *International Organization* 301-322.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pareti, Samisoni. 2013. "Fiji Pushes for Alternative to Pacific Islands Forum," *ABC News*, August 6. Available at `http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-06/fiji-forum/4867748`. Accessed 23 October, 2014.

Patel, Khadija. 2013. Analysis: What does the AU gain from suspending Egypt? *Daily Maverick*, July 8. Available at `http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-07-08-analysis-what-does-the-au-gain-from-suspending-egypt/#.UvEiVvldUXg`. Accessed 4 February 2014.

Pevehouse, Jon. 2002a. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 611-626.

——. 2002b. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization* 56: 515-54.

——. 2005. *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 (2): 101-119.

Poast, Paul, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2013. How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation? Mimeo.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2008. The logic of practicality: A theory of practice of security communities. *International Organization* 62 (2): 257-288.

Reenock, Chris, Jeffrey Staton, and Marius Radean. 2013. Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival. *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 491-505.

Reiter, Dan. 2001. Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy. *International Security* 25 (4): 41-67.

Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: The Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure. *American Political Science Review* 99 (3):389-400.

Ross, Michael. 1999. The political economy of the resource curse. *World politics* 51 (2): 297-322.

——. 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations.* Princeton University Press.

Schimmelfennig, F., and Sedelmeier, U. 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European public policy* 11 (4): 661-679.

Sedelmeier, U. 2014. Anchoring democracy from above? The European Union and democratic backsliding in Hungary and Romania after accession. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (1): 105-121.

Simmons, Beth A. and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. International Organization 64 (2): 225-256.

Smith, Amelia. 2014. "Egypt excluded from the US-Africa Summit," Middle East Monitor, January 24. Available at `https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/politics/9408-egypt-excluded-from-the-us-africa-summit`. Accessed 4 February 2014

Snidal, D. 1985. Coordination versus prisoners' dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes. *American Political Science Review* 923-942.

Spector, B., and I. Zartman. 2003. *Getting it done: postagreement negotiation and international regimes.* US Institute of Peace Press.

Stone, Randall. 2011. *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy.* Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, Ginger and Mark Lacey. 2009. "OAS Votes to Suspend Honduras Over Coup." *New York Times*, July 4. `http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/05honduras.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0`. Accessed 18 August 2014.

U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1998. "The OAS and the road to Santiago: building a hemispheric community in the Americas: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright," Transcript, 1 March 1998, Vol. 9, No. 2, ISSN: 1051-7693.

Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. *American journal of sociology* 548-577.

Wintour, Patrick. 2007. Failure to meet deadline brings fresh commonwealth suspension. *The Guardian*, November 23. Available at `http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/23/pakistan.politics`. Accessed 14 August 2014.

World Bank. 2012. Development Indicators. Available at `http://data.worldbank.org/indicator` Accessed 10 April 2012.

Online Appendix

This online appendix contains two sections:

1. Robustness checks in Appendix Tables 1-4, including further control variables, sample restriction to backsliding cases and types, and rare events logit models.

2. Details on original data collection and coding decisions, including suspension (dependent variable), democratically committed IGOs (sample restriction), democratic commitment strength and voting rules for suspension (independent variables).

Appendix Table 1: Robustness Checks: Adding further controls

	Willing			Able			Unified model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Stage 2: Suspension							
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.352						0.175
	(0.179)**						(0.158)
Member in more democratic IGO		0.099					0.098
		(0.030)***					(0.038)***
Allied with regional power			-0.239				-0.257
			(0.083)***				(0.091)***
IGO voting rule				-0.875			
				(0.701)			
IGO size					0.017		0.013
					(0.011)		(0.009)
IGO size squared					-0.000		-0.000
					(0.000)+		(0.000)
IGO clause on suspension						-0.008	0.021
						(0.106)	(0.105)
Regional IGO	0.352	0.390	0.404	0.768	0.257	0.407	0.249
	(0.085)***	(0.077)***	(0.087)***	(0.191)***	(0.080)***	(0.087)***	(0.124)**
Regional democracy score	0.044	0.037	0.054	0.023	0.050	0.051	0.036
	(0.020)**	(0.018)**	(0.020)***	(0.048)	(0.022)**	(0.020)***	(0.021)*
Regional development score	-0.018	-0.101	-0.020	0.021	-0.065	-0.047	-0.072
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.088)
Post Cold War	0.153	0.177	0.119	0.316	0.107	0.115	0.170
	(0.085)*	(0.089)**	(0.092)	(0.130)**	(0.093)	(0.084)	(0.081)**
Population size (logged)	-0.001	-0.013	0.005	0.045	0.005	0.002	-0.012
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)
IGO observed elections	0.233	0.290	0.364	0.438	0.237	0.296	0.292
	(0.102)**	(0.100)***	(0.106)***	(0.193)**	(0.103)**	(0.111)***	(0.079)***
IGO history of suspension	0.475	0.627	0.636	0.629	0.486	0.651	0.403
	(0.094)***	(0.125)***	(0.131)***	(0.206)***	(0.119)***	(0.137)***	(0.118)***
Economic sanction	0.314	0.286	0.334	0.333	0.327	0.325	0.294
	(0.085)***	(0.085)***	(0.091)***	(0.116)***	(0.086)***	(0.088)***	(0.086)***
Political backsliding degree	0.089	0.087	0.088	0.099	0.093	0.089	0.089
	(0.014)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.026)***	(0.014)***	(0.013)***	(0.014)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
IGO democratic commitment strength	-0.021	-0.017	-0.017	-0.253	-0.020	-0.018	-0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.160)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Member in more democratic IGO	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.055	0.060	0.060	0.059
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.008)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
IGO clause on suspension	0.020	0.020	0.020	1.130	0.021	0.020	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.452)**	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
GDP growth	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
GDP pc (logged)	-0.199	-0.199	-0.199	-0.175	-0.199	-0.199	-0.199
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.016)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***
Member natural resources pc (logged)	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Democracy	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.028	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Age of democracy (logged)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.017	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Effective number of parties (logged)	-0.199	-0.198	-0.199	-0.175	-0.199	-0.199	-0.198
	(0.027)***	(0.027)***	(0.027)***	(0.031)***	(0.027)***	(0.027)***	(0.027)***
Ethnic fractionalization	0.175	0.172	0.174	0.164	0.175	0.174	0.173
	(0.031)***	(0.031)***	(0.031)***	(0.040)***	(0.031)***	(0.031)***	(0.031)***
Political System	-0.033	-0.033	-0.033	-0.034	-0.033	-0.033	-0.033
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.021)*	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Observations	37525	37525	37525	27418	37525	37525	37525
Pseudo R^2							
AIC	48340.99	48343.33	48345.12	28526.84	48339.01	48348.39	48336.74
BIC	48545.77	48548.11	48549.91	28724.09	48552.33	48553.17	48584.19
Rho	-0.900	-0.901	-0.886	-0.849	-0.896	-0.886	-0.912
Pr(chi2)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Heckman probit models with standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
+ $p < 0.11$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 2: Robustness Checks: Post-Cold War period only

	Willing			Able			Unified model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Stage 2: Suspension							
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.726						0.363
	(0.246)***						(0.220)*
Member in more democratic IGO		0.147					0.149
		(0.033)***					(0.034)***
Allied with regional power			0.137				0.040
			(0.183)				(0.109)
IGO voting rule				-1.542			
				(1.266)			
IGO size					0.058		0.037
					(0.021)***		(0.015)**
IGO size squared					-0.001		-0.000
					(0.000)***		(0.000)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.132	0.035
						(0.193)	(0.151)
Regional IGO	0.351	0.419	0.486	1.228	0.144	0.441	0.151
	(0.191)*	(0.185)**	(0.213)**	(0.357)***	(0.179)	(0.179)**	(0.134)
Regional democracy score	0.004	-0.001	0.013	-0.077	0.016	0.017	-0.004
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.072)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Regional development score	0.076	-0.070	-0.005	0.231	-0.018	0.000	-0.071
	(0.071)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.109)**	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.049)
year	0.042	0.036	0.046	0.090	0.043	0.041	0.041
	(0.018)**	(0.016)**	(0.022)**	(0.028)***	(0.016)***	(0.019)**	(0.016)**
Population size (logged)	0.005	-0.013	0.009	0.052	0.003	0.010	-0.020
	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
GDP growth	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
GDP pc (logged)	-0.180	-0.181	-0.180	-0.160	-0.180	-0.180	-0.181
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.022)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***
Member natural resources pc (logged)	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.006	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.003)*	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Democracy	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.027	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.005)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Age of democracy (logged)	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.004	0.014	0.014	0.014
	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.016)	(0.007)**	(0.007)**	(0.007)**
Effective number of parties (logged)	-0.185	-0.183	-0.185	-0.152	-0.185	-0.185	-0.183
	(0.021)***	(0.021)***	(0.021)***	(0.027)***	(0.021)***	(0.021)***	(0.021)***
Observations	31154	31123	31154	22642	31154	31154	31123
Pseudo R^2							
AIC	40425.28	40426.34	40459.56	26738.76	40421.01	40458.68	40387.05
BIC	40550.48	40551.52	40584.76	26859.17	40554.55	40583.88	40553.97
Rho	-0.753	-0.796	-0.662	-0.624	-0.739	-0.664	-0.860
Pr(chi2)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Heckman probit models with standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.11$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 3: Robustness Checks: Restricting the sample to backsliding

	All Backsliding						**Human rights violations only**						**Democracy violations only**					
		Willing			Able			Willing			Able			Willing			Able	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.925						1.014						0.918					
	(0.260)***						(0.326)***						(0.286)***					
Member in more democratic IGO		0.128						0.170						0.142				
		(0.033)***						(0.042)***						(0.038)***				
Allied with regional power			-0.381						-0.368						-0.414			
			(0.158)**						(0.156)**						(0.173)**			
IGO voting rule				-2.595						-2.363						0.000		
				(1.214)**						(1.247)*						(.)		
IGO size					0.061						0.057						0.069	
					(0.022)***						(0.020)***						(0.028)**	
IGO size squared					-0.001						-0.001						-0.001	
					(0.000)***						(0.000)***						(0.000)**	
IGO clause on suspension						0.125						0.224						0.078
						(0.229)						(0.259)						(0.259)
Regional IGO	0.410	0.600	0.609	1.262	0.308	0.547	0.413	0.634	0.634	1.293	0.330	0.532	0.332	0.531	0.556	1.230	0.274	0.502
	(0.279)	(0.268)**	(0.265)**	(0.224)***	(0.277)	(0.220)**	(0.299)	(0.287)**	(0.286)**	(0.233)***	(0.276)	(0.233)**	(0.340)	(0.311)*	(0.304)*	(0.244)***	(0.339)	(0.249)**
Regional democracy score	0.016	0.008	0.044	-0.009	0.031	0.033	0.026	0.012	0.050	-0.037	0.041	0.044	0.032	0.014	0.057	-0.018	0.048	0.041
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.022)**	(0.078)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.072)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.024)**	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.021)**
Regional development score	-0.117	-0.235	-0.157	-0.086	-0.188	-0.171	-0.188	-0.326	-0.212	0.001	-0.253	-0.238	-0.049	-0.158	-0.081	0.063	-0.111	-0.085
	(0.106)	(0.088)***	(0.097)	(0.277)	(0.101)*	(0.099)*	(0.149)	(0.122)***	(0.142)	(0.258)	(0.143)*	(0.140)*	(0.106)	(0.070)**	(0.091)	(0.234)	(0.100)	(0.090)
Post Cold War	0.274	0.265	0.145	0.427	0.225	0.264	0.036	0.064	-0.032	0.387	-0.004	0.060	0.305	0.307	0.149	0.498	0.221	0.301
	(0.196)	(0.137)*	(0.099)	(0.179)**	(0.187)	(0.142)*	(0.206)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.173)**	(0.198)	(0.142)	(0.213)	(0.146)**	(0.100)	(0.189)***	(0.196)	(0.153)**
Population size (logged)	0.032	-0.013	0.038	0.108	0.038	0.036	0.045	-0.019	0.046	0.126	0.053	0.046	-0.022	-0.056	-0.007	0.057	-0.021	-0.018
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.021)*	(0.041)***	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.039)***	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.028)**	(0.029)	(0.077)	(0.040)	(0.033)
Observations	21925	20806	21925	10321	21925	21925	13276	12564	13276	6280	13276	13276	13555	13026	13555	4523	13555	13555
Pseudo R^2	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.21	0.19	0.09	0.17	0.11	0.10	0.21	0.18	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.09	0.18	0.20	0.08
AIC	383.01	411.42	413.70	222.13	376.37	417.44	261.46	279.88	283.89	171.75	260.47	284.97	287.60	309.64	311.29	148.62	277.11	315.51
BIC	438.98	467.02	469.67	272.82	440.33	473.41	313.92	331.95	336.35	218.97	320.42	337.42	340.20	361.96	363.89	187.12	337.23	368.11

Note: Probit models with standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. In model 16, voting rules higher than simple majority perfectly predict lack of suspension and are thus dropped.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 4: Robustness Checks: Rare events logit

	Willing			Able			Unified model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
IGO democratic commitment strength	2.891						1.391
	(0.968)***						(0.935)
Member in more democratic IGO		0.640					0.684
		(0.135)***					(0.136)***
Allied with regional power			-0.970				-1.179
			(0.495)**				(0.506)**
IGO voting rule				-5.031			
				(3.461)			
IGO size					0.159		0.115
					(0.069)**		(0.066)*
IGO size squared					-0.002		-0.001
					(0.001)**		(0.001)*
IGO clause on suspension						0.495	0.179
						(0.721)	(0.718)
Regional IGO	1.241	1.923	1.962	3.405	0.783	1.741	1.049
	(0.854)	(0.852)**	(0.841)**	(0.752)***	(0.758)	(0.706)**	(0.677)
Regional democracy score	0.131	0.114	0.214	0.072	0.179	0.188	0.079
	(0.107)	(0.089)	(0.084)**	(0.285)	(0.100)*	(0.086)**	(0.104)
Regional development score	0.015	-0.469	-0.166	0.314	-0.259	-0.211	-0.321
	(0.347)	(0.306)	(0.333)	(0.972)	(0.314)	(0.343)	(0.296)
Post Cold War	0.283	0.291	-0.034	0.498	0.092	0.361	-0.101
	(0.600)	(0.413)	(0.310)	(0.564)	(0.542)	(0.446)	(0.363)
Population size (logged)	0.083	-0.011	0.077	0.237	0.088	0.094	-0.065
	(0.111)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.179)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.095)
Probability of political backsliding	13.648	17.175	12.645	14.413	12.696	13.052	16.653
	(2.730)***	(2.360)***	(2.645)***	(4.072)***	(2.574)***	(2.618)***	(2.391)***
Observations	38185	38154	38185	18077	38185	38185	38154
AIC		429.367	436.434	235.827	398.737	438.035	384.924
BIC		497.762	504.836	298.246	475.688	506.436	496.066

Note: Rare events logit models with standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$